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Abstract 
 
The development of Airbus’ A380 and Boeing’s B787 seems to these manufacturers 
have differing views of future airline networks.  This assesses from published sources 
the likely preferences of leisure and business passengers for different airline network 
approaches and also assesses airline strategies through the economic cycle.   The 
manufacturers seem to have substitutable aircraft types.  Both leisure and business 
travellers are increasingly price elastic and growth in both markets means both 
aircraft type will be successful aircraft meeting differing needs.  However, airline 
market share strategies are likely to undermine the success of hub by-pass or hub-to-
hub focus strategies throughout the cycle.   
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Introduction 
 
2005 was the first year when over 2,000 new aircraft were ordered by airlines, clearly 
optimistic of a future where growth and new opportunities would enable them to 
profitably employ such large volumes of new planes. The previous order peak in was 
in 2000 when nearly 1,600 aircraft were ordered.  This was quickly followed by an 
economic downturn greatly exacerbated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, excess capacity, 
and four years of significant losses across the airline industry.  The magnitude of the 
2005 order book represents both demand suppressed during the downturn and a return 
in confidence in the industry.   
 
During the poor years of the early 2000s the two main aircraft manufacturers (Boeing 
and Airbus) have positioned themselves to serve rather different visions of the future 
as somewhat simplistically described in the press (e.g. BBC, 2005): the new 550 seat 
Airbus A380 demonstrates Airbus’ view of a future where congested hub airport 
capacity may be overcome by carrying passengers between these congested 
continental hubs in large capacity aircraft.  Boeing’s vision of the air transport 
industry in the future is evidenced by the development of a much smaller capacity 
210-290
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 long-range aircraft - the B787.  In this vision congested hubs are by-passed 
by travellers flying direct (or with fewer stops/connections) from their point of origin 
to their final destination.   
 
Faced with these differing views of the future a panel session at the 9
th
 Hamburg 
Aviation Conference sort to discuss the following questions: 
 
 Are Airbus and Boeing pursuing complementary or substitute strategies? 
                                                 
1
 The B787-3 is a larger capacity (up to 330 seats) shorter-range variant.  
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 Does choice of aircraft matter less or more when markets are growing? 
 Given how and which markets are growing, which combination of aircraft will 
be winners or fair better than others? 
 
 
Boeing and Airbus’ strategies – complementary or substitutes? 
 
As one would expect when multi-billion dollar decisions have been adopted by the 
world’s two largest airframe manufacturers, arguments can be made for logic of both 
strategies.   
 
If the growth rates in air travel over the past 20 years extend into the future, the main 
continental hub airports, many of which are already congested, are unlikely to be able 
to sustain the level of growth without some way of increasing passenger throughput 
per aircraft movement.  Both Boeing and Airbus have similar forecasts of the future 
market.  Boeing forecast annual passenger growth of 4.8% and Airbus at 5.3% per 
annum from 2005 till 2024 with the worldwide fleet more than doubling with about 
17,000 (Boeing, 2005, Airbus 2004).  The A380, by increasing capacity on wide-body 
aircraft by some 20% over the 747, enables operating airlines to increase passenger 
numbers in city-pair markets where airport congestion or slot restrictions have 
curtailed growth while enjoying a reduction in seat costs.  The future success of 
network carriers’ strategy of consolidating passenger flows through principal hub 
airports will require such operators to increase the flow from one continental main 
hub to another and thus the A380 seems well suited to meeting the needs of such 
operators.  Indeed its competitor Boeing’s success over the past 30 years has been 
based, in no small part, on its sales of the B747.  Until the development of the A380, 
without a competitor in the 400+ seat market, Boeing has been able to dominate the 
market for large inter-hub aircraft.  While its research suggests that aircraft operating 
at hub airports have, in fact, been getting smaller by seat count (Swan, 2005) and its 
principal developmental efforts have been focused on the hub-bypassing B787, 
Boeing announced in November 2005 that it would once-again stretch its B747
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 so as 
not to cede totally the very large aircraft market to Airbus.   
 
While Airbus has been developing the mass passenger transit A380, Boeing 
announced the development of a near-supersonic cruiser that was aimed at capturing 
money-rich, time-poor business passengers.  However in the post 9/11 environment 
the manufacturer did not find sufficient takers for this concept and replaced it with the 
B787; an aircraft aimed at reducing operating and seat costs by using new 
technologies, materials and engines.  The manufacturer set the capacity for the new 
aircraft based on the success British Airways and others had found by switching from 
B747s into the lower capacity aircraft 777.  BA discovered on their North Atlantic 
routes that when they switched gauge to the 777, traffic that it had previously carried 
on a marginal revenue basis (but was essentially not profitable) could not now be 
accommodated and thus, although the airline carried fewer passengers that its 
profitability improved (BA, 2001).  Rather than competing head-on with Airbus on a 
new super-jumbo, Boeing’s view was that by placing this low seat-cost aircraft on 
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 The B747-8 “Intercontinental” will carry up to 500 passengers and by using some of 
the new technologies developed for the 787, Boeing is promising lower seat costs 
than the A380.  To date, only the freighter version has secured orders. 
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thinner routes that by-passed at least one continental hub an operator could capture 
higher yielding passengers seeking a more direct routing.  Airbus, seeing the quick 
uptake of the B787 (see later), has also sought to cover this area of the market and 
announced in 2005 the development of the A350, an evolution of the A330, placing it 
in direct competition with the B787
3
.  
 
The development of the A350 and the B747-8 “Intercontinental” demonstrates that 
neither manufacturer is prepared to unilaterally cede any part of the widebody market 
to its competitor.  Whichever view of the airline market place of the future is more 
likely, be it dominated by network carriers that funnel large consignments of their 
traffic through major hubs with very large aircraft, or one in which carriers focus on 
thinner but higher yielding routes using smaller sized widebodies, or some 
combination of these strategies, both manufacturers are positioning themselves to able 
to cater for the needs of the successful airlines under both scenarios.  It would seem 
therefore that essentially both manufacturers are pursuing substitute strategies.  It is, 
therefore, necessary to assess the airlines’ strategies. 
 
 
The 2005 aircraft order book 
 
When committing an airline to the cost of new aircraft with a useful life of some 25 
years it would seem logical that the responsible airline executives would make their 
decisions considering both market growth and recession.   
 
During 2005 Airbus and Boeing took the following orders:- 
 
Table 1: 2005 Airframe orders, Airbus and Boeing 
Airbus Boeing 
918 x A320 family 569 x B737 
166 x A330/340/350 15 x B767 
154 x B777 
235 x B787 
 43 x B747 
20 x A380  
Source: ATI, 2006 
 
While much of journalistic discussion has focused on new aircraft types, 70% of the 
orders in 2005 were for narrow-body aircraft as the low cost carrier phenomenon 
spread throughout Europe and spread further a field.  Some analysts have suggested 
the size of the 2005 order book is in no small part due to carriers attempting to secure 
delivery slots and for the 150-seat size aircraft the orders may represent a large part of 
the total requirement of the market for the next few years (Tarry, 2006). 
  
Boeing’s launch of the B787 has been its most successful and the aircraft seems 
certain to have a significant impact on the structure of airline fleets for many years to 
come. This is also likely to be the case for the operators that select the A380 and the 
carriers that compete with them.  To date Airbus has secured 159 orders (September 
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 Although in June 2006 it was subsequently announced that the A350 would have a 
wider body and larger seating capacity than originally announced. 
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2006) for the A380. The manufacturer only sees a total market for this size of aircraft 
as only 1,648 until 2023 (Airbus, 2004).  The orders that have been received for the 
A380 have come from two principal regions.  The Middle East and Asia.  Emirates 
has made the single largest order taking 43 of 49 so far ordered by middle eastern 
carriers. This airline’s strategy is to make Dubai a one-stop transit point connecting 
many of the largest markets in the world.  The airport has no congestion issues and 
the airline sees the aircraft as the best way of achieving very low cost seat costs in 
very large city-pair markets where it is likely to be mainly a combination 3
rd
/4
th
 
freedom carrier requiring it to offer discounted seats to capture traffic.  The majority 
of the rest of the orders have come from carriers that have their principal long haul 
operations between Europe to Australasia (e.g. Singapore, Qantas, Malaysian) and 
will look to capture more traffic by increasing capacity by adopting this new aircraft. 
 
To consider the second question regarding aircraft choice through the cycle the 
demand side of the industry will first be considered, looking at leisure and business 
travellers separately.  This will be followed by considering airline strategies through 
the cycle. 
 
 
 
Leisure travellers in the economic cycle 
 
Throughout the economic cycle leisure travellers will tend to be more price elastic 
than business travellers.   
 
During good economic times people will tend to earn more money and therefore will 
also have higher disposable incomes.  Recently the world economy has enjoyed a 
period of sustained low interest rates and generally good economic growth.  These 
low interests rates mean that people tend to have higher disposable incomes as interest 
payments on borrowings, particularly mortgages, are low.  Not only do low interest 
rates increase people’s disposable income, they also reduce the incentive to save 
money and therefore recent years have seen a number of large countries, particularly 
in North America and Europe develop into high consumption economies. For the 
airline industry people’s increased propensity to spend combined with the 
development of low cost airlines has meant a rapid growth in leisure travel. Travellers 
have increased the number of leisure trips they make each year as they have embraced 
the low cost carriers.  For example in the UK short haul leisure travel rose at nearly 
15% per annum between 1998 and 2003 shifting the proportion of leisure trips from 
50% to 68% of all trips during the five year period (Mason, 2005).  This growing 
leisure market has led fledgling and recently established airlines to make significant 
orders for B737s and A320s.  Recent years have also seen a growing monied middle 
classes in high growth markets such as China, India and Russia and this has led to 
high growth from modest levels in leisure travel.   
 
While the leisure market has seen sustained growth due to good economic conditions, 
and the development of low fare airlines in many markets, leisure travel by air is also 
a substitute for many other ways people can spend their disposable income.  In short 
haul markets surface modes, particularly the car and high-speed rail compete with air 
for passengers.  Low cost carriers have captured market share away from these modes 
in recent years due to very low fares, however, should relative prices go up due to 
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reduced competition, or perhaps new environmental taxes air could lose traffic back 
to these other modes.  Leisure time is limited the amount of free time people have to 
take holidays cannot be increased thus placing a barrier on the growth of leisure 
travel.   As low cost carriers in Europe have grown there is evidence that shows 
leisure travellers are taking more frequent, shorter-duration holidays (Graham, 2006). 
However, the increase in multiple holidays is limited by the number of annual days 
holiday people can take.  Leisure travel also competes with other ways of spending 
disposable income.  In recent years home computers, iPods, hi-fi systems and high 
definition flat screen televisions have all grown in popularity and vie for leisure 
travellers’ disposable consumption (Graham, 2000).   
 
During periods of economic downturn lower disposable income, lower consumer 
confidence, higher job insecurity, and higher precautionary savings are likely to 
dampen the demand for leisure travel.  
 
For airlines, economic downturns means lower yields and lower demand.  For the low 
cost carrier segment in Europe, following a period of intense development and start-
ups any economic downturn will increase the rate of consolidation as weaker carriers 
fail or are acquired.  This may also lead to cancellations of aircraft orders and a lower 
uptake of options.  Ryanair and easyJet both benefited from poor post-9/11 economic 
conditions to drive very good deals for large aircraft orders with Boeing and Airbus 
respectively. It is likely that if these two players survive in the medium term, which is 
expected, that they will await another period of harsh economic conditions before 
they place any new orders.   
 
In longer haul markets leisure travellers will seek the best prices thereby pushing 
down yields for all airlines operating in the market.   The three main airline alliances; 
Star, oneworld, and SkyTeam all compete strongly in markets where intermediate 
stops are necessary.  For example a customer travelling from New York to Singapore 
can use the Star Alliance transiting over Frankfurt, oneworld transiting over Heathrow 
or SkyTeam transiting over Paris.  With similar elapsed journey times and similar on 
board products the airline alliances will compete on price for this customer pushing 
the airlines toward discounting.  The presence of 6
th
 freedom and 3
rd
 and 4
th
 freedom 
combination operators that are also found in many markets further depress fares in a 
bid to win consumers.  In such depressed market, airlines will have to encourage 
customers to spend their more limited disposable income on leisure travel rather than 
save their money, or switch to cheaper surface modes of transport (especially the car).  
This will mean that the principal airlines operation in each market will have to fight 
hard to achieve a profitable operation. 
 
 
Business travellers in the economic cycle 
 
Changes in world Revenue Tonnes Kilometres (RTKs) tend to move in a reasonably 
direct relationship to changes in global Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  As business 
people and entrepreneurs seek new opportunities and make new deals with partners 
and clients in remote locations they travel to have meetings, sign contracts and 
implement business plans.  As new economic activity is created airlines benefit from 
greater levels of business travel.  Conversely, as economies move toward recession, 
business confidence is reduced, fewer economic opportunities are available, and thus 
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business people and entrepreneurs travel less, and their companies seek to reduce the 
costs associated with conducting business and employ alternative methods of 
communication.   
 
During good economic conditions it is expected that business travellers would tend to 
be price inelastic and demand increased service on the ground and in the air, however 
during the recent sound economic conditions the market has not behaved in this 
fashion.  During the post 9/11 economic downturn there was an increased degree of 
price elasticity that became apparent in the market.  The growth of greater 
competition in the form of alliance groupings for long haul and low cost carriers in 
short haul markets seems to have introduced a profound change in the elasticity of the 
market.  There seems to be a diminishing proportion of business class and first class 
passengers (Mason, 2005), and the business travel market seems to be separating into 
two groups. For the majority of business travellers travel in first or business class 
cabins has become rare.  In the post-9/11 days the least price sensitive most time 
sensitive passengers started making greater use of executive jet services where they 
could avoid long security delays and fly more directly. Following recent terrorist 
threats in the UK on US bound aircraft, the US National Business Aviation 
Association has seen rapid rise in demand from its current $2.6bn level. The 
association forecasts a doubling of private jets to a fleet of more 5,000 by 2011 
(ABTN, 2006).  However, this group of price insensitive travellers seems to be 
reasonably small.  A Delphi study conducted for the European Union suggested that 
network carriers would only lose a small (if financially significant) number of 
passengers to the executive jet market (EU, 2005).  For short haul travel only the 
proportion of business travellers that use business class has fallen to 15% from about 
60% in the late 1990s. For long haul travel the proportion has fallen to around 40% 
(BA SOURCE).   In short haul markets business travellers have become more price 
sensitive as low cost carriers have become commonplace.  This is partially due to the 
companies that employ business travellers which for many years have defined when a 
traveller can use business class or first class services but have become have made 
these definitions more strict and more effective in controlling travellers and enforcing 
travel policy.  For the proportion of travellers that are allowed to use business class, 
lower cost alternatives direct services seem to becoming attractive.  EOS and MAXjet 
both offer business-only services from an secondary London airport (Stansted) to 
New York and seem to have established themselves successfully in this highly 
competitive market.  Lufthansa’s PrivatAir business-only service also to New York 
has also successfully operated for two years. The development and growth of direct 
business-only services that bypass hubs are likely to have a detrimental impact on the 
economics of hub-to-hub business class services. These direct services are likely to 
draw passengers away from the mainline operators and also provide downward 
pressure on business class prices for the network operators.  As the A380 enters 
service some operators have indicated a upgraded services for business-class and first-
class passengers, it would seem unlikely that these services be sufficient to retain 
business travellers if lower fare, direct business-only service alternatives are 
available. 
 
While airlines struggle to retain the proportion of the business travel market that still 
use business class, they also must address the larger part of the business travel market.  
The part of the market that have become serial down-graders; those business 
travellers that primarily travel in either premium economy, or economy class cabins, 
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or frequently use low cost airline services.   While this group of price conscious 
business travellers tended to be those that worked for small and medium enterprises, 
more people that work for large companies have moved into this segment of the 
market as companies get better at enforcing travel policies aimed at reducing travel 
expenditure.  Indeed a survey of more than 350 travel managers found that 23% of 
companies mandated that travellers travel at the “lowest available cost” and for a 
further 52% of companies it this was “stated company preference”4 (BTRC, 2006).   
 
In a bid to arrest some of the revenue decline with business travellers downgrading 
while presenting themselves as offering “value for money” products, some network 
carriers are beginning to unbundle their product elements.  Airlines such as Air 
Canada and British Airways have started offering travellers the ability to mix and 
match the class of service and level of ticket flexibility they purchase on out-bound 
and in-bound sectors.  On out-bound sectors business travellers are less likely to need 
to change their flight arrangements if client/sales meeting are fixed, but travellers may 
need to travel in business class comfort to ensure they are well rested before meeting 
clients/customers.  On in-bound sectors these same travellers may need a flexible 
ticket as meetings may overrun, however the company they work for are less 
concerned their employees arriving well rested.  Therefore the airlines have begun to 
offer travellers the ability to combine a non-flexible, business class out-bound ticket 
with a flexible, economy class in-bound ticket.  This unbundling trend begun as low 
cost carriers introduced the concept of passengers only paying for those services that 
they wish to use and is now likely to be more widely adopted by network carriers. 
 
In larger companies the past few years has seen greater management control in the 
business travel purchase decision.  The more widespread use of self booking tools that 
incorporate all the companies travel policy that forces policy compliance will mean 
this trend will continue.  This is likely to lead companies to make travel purchase 
decisions on a return on investment (ROI) basis.  This may well lead to increased 
substitution of less essential travel by other forms of communication, and real time 
appraisal of the likely value that a particular trip will bring to the company.  As 
Corporate Social Responsibility increases in importance to companies many might 
begin to make purchase decisions that incorporate the environmental costs of the trip. 
 
 
Airline strategies through the economic cycle. 
 
To examine the aircraft choice for airlines the adopted strategies need to be assessed.  
While standard management tools are rarely particularly useful in the aviation 
business, application of Porter’s generic strategies of diversification and cost 
leadership (Porter, 1980) can both be seen in the industry.  By focusing on meeting 
the needs of higher yield passengers and developing brand messages that create a 
belief of a premium service some carriers can be viewed as having adopted the first 
strategy (e.g. Singapore, Virgin, British Airways, etc.).  In recent years low cost 
carriers have attempted to follow a cost leadership strategy (e.g. Ryanair, AirAsia). 
For network carriers that adopt strategies that give sustainable seat cost advantage 
over their competitors, cost leadership is also a key strategy.  
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 These percentages are provisional as the survey is, as yet, not complete. 
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The development of new aircraft by Boeing and Airbus that seem to serve different 
airline route and network strategies has led to an examination of which strategy is best 
suited to the airline business cycle.  An airline operating an A380 would seem to be 
following a multi-stop/hub-to-hub/consolidation/lowest seat cost strategy.  An airline 
that purchases the B787 may be adopting a non- or one-stop/hub by-pass 
diversification strategy aimed at capturing higher yielding passengers.    It is the 
airline strategy not the aircraft manufacturers’ strategies that should be assessed as the 
manufacturers strategies are substitutes and interchangeable – each offer a 
comparable aircraft in all sizes and ranges.  
 
Perhaps the most detrimental strategy adopted by the airline managements 
irrespective of their underlying generic strategy and geographic location is one of 
market leadership in each city-pair market served. The strategy of pursuing market 
share is based on the S-Curve model as shown below.  The S-Curve strategy argues 
that below a certain frequency (or seat capacity
5
) share that the airline will capture 
less market share than the frequency/capacity share it supplies – thereby 
“underperforming” its supply (Alamdari, 1997). The shape of the S-Curve will 
depend on the market, the number of players operating in the market, the nature of the 
city-pair market route and the number of alternatives routings. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Frequency/Market Share S-Curve  
NB: Both the X- and Y-axes are of the same scale. 
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 Frequency share is the more logical metric to use for the analysis although it can be 
calculated using either frequency or seat-capacity share. 
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The strategy implied from the S-Curve model is that an airline will naturally seek to 
gain market share.  Above a certain share of the frequency (circa 15%) the steep 
gradient of the curve implies that the airline will capture a larger proportion of the 
market share than its contributed share of supply. By so doing, it can be argued that 
the more prominent in a market an operator is the more likely it is to win more 
passengers.  If a carrier can dominate the frequency in the market then it will also take 
the lion’s share of the passengers.  It is also more likely to attract higher-yielding 
business passengers who are attracted to higher-frequency services so that should the 
need arrive they can more easily alter their travel arrangements.  Once in a position of 
dominance the airline is a position to dictate prices, push out competitors and deter 
entrants by having the best listings in the key distribution channels in the market and 
by having the most attractive FFP programme offering as it has the best network on 
which passengers can earn and burn FFP points.    
 
However there are some flaws in the concept.  Firstly, for longer haul city-pair 
markets, the multiple routings available to consumers (e.g. in the London-Sydney 
market passengers can connect over Dubai with Emirates, over Bangkok or Singapore 
with Star Alliance, over Hong Kong with Cathay and British Airways, etc.) means 
that market share cannot be easily protected in any one routing.  Secondly, there is an 
implicit assumption that all passengers along the Y-axis are of the same value to the 
airline.  This is clearly not be the case as it includes passengers from the highest 
paying first class passenger to the customer carrying the most highly discounted 
ticket.  Thirdly, the argument that higher frequency will lead to higher yields may not 
hold true as low cost airline pricing strategies become adopted by traditional airlines.   
EasyJet has introduced flexible ticketing on a “pay-as-you-go” basis and as previously 
noted, Air Canada and British Airways and other network carriers have begun 
unbundling ticket flexibility from their inclusive prices.  It is likely, as this practice 
becomes more widely adopted, that passengers will continue to favour airlines that 
offer higher frequencies but this will not necessarily lead to a significant premiums 
for those airlines.   
 
In the growth phase of the economic cycle airlines tend to adopt a market share 
strategy following the Boston Consulting Group Portfolio strategy that argues in fast 
growing markets a company should invest heavily to ensure that once the market 
matures the company enjoys a large market share and can subsequently take 
significant abnormal profits without any significant competition.   However as growth 
slows or as markets enter a downturn airlines generally do not face the market 
conditions as suggested by the BCG matrix.  Under the BCG Matrix theory a 
company that dominates market share in a slow growing mature market should adopt 
a strategy of drawing as much profit from this market (Kotler, 1988).  In the airline 
industry the frequent presence of alternative routing 6
th
 freedom services on long haul 
markets and low cost carrier competition in short haul markets means that such a 
strategy is hard to execute.  Faced with a low growing market, the dominant market 
share leader will not be able to draw out significant profits.   In a downturn, as all 
airlines begin to suffer, the ones with the larger market shares defend their position in 
the hope that carriers with less market share will not be able to survive the downturn 
and eventually withdraw from the city-pair market.    In these conditions the airline 
with the more direct routing and the smaller carrier will most likely capture higher 
yielding passengers.  The carrier with the larger aircraft size may lose passengers 
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unless they drop fares, and even if it does it may have too much capacity for a 
contracted demand and make losses. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
This note set out to address three questions.  In response to the first, it has been 
concluded that Airbus and Boeing have substitute strategies with both manufacturers 
attempting to provide products across the seat capacity and range spectrum.  In 
respect of the second question; does choice of aircraft matter less or more when 
markets are growing?  The paper has attempted to examine consumer behaviour and 
airline strategies throughout the cycle and concluded that leisure travellers are 
generally price elastic throughout the cycle, but more so in the downturn, and that 
although the presence of low cost carriers boosts demand, there is a limit to the 
number of holidays they can take during the year.  Business passengers are 
increasingly price sensitive and value driven throughout the cycle as corporate 
involvement and self-booking tools become more prevalent in the market.  As both 
segments of the market are increasingly price elastic, it would seem that the lowest 
cost/lower fare airline will be best situated throughout the cycle. In good economic 
conditions and in very dense and congested markets the A380 will provide the 
additional capacity to increase revenues for operating airlines. However, in the 
downturn, airlines with excessive capacity may well lose money even with very low 
seat costs as they struggle to fill their capacity. With a market of increasing elasticity, 
seat costs are clearly very important and the A380 will enjoy a seat cost advantage 
over the B787 but use of the latter is likely to attract the higher yielding element of 
the available traffic. It has been argued that throughout the cycle airlines tend to 
pursue market share strategies, sometimes at the cost of profitability. This rather leads 
onto the final question; given how and which markets are growing, which 
combination of aircraft will be winners or fair better than others?  This question more 
than the others is impossible to answer in a general or theoretic manner.  The answer 
will depend on the geographic location of the airline, the routes served, the regulatory 
environment and the competition faced.  Both the A380 and the B787 will have roles 
to play in the future aviation market and it is hoped that a more liberal regulatory 
framework of the future will better encourage airlines to adopt strategies that employ 
them profitability to create a wealth generating industry. 
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